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SYMPOSIUM 
THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF PROPERTY:                 
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
INTRODUCTION 
Sheila R. Foster* & Daniel Bonilla**
 
 
The classical liberal conception of property dominates the modern legal 
and political imagination.  The idea that property is a subjective and nearly 
absolute right controls the way in which much of modern law and politics 
understand this institution.  It is common for citizens, politicians, and 
academics to view property as an individual right that is limited only by the 
rights of others and the public interest.  The holder of this right is therefore 
someone who can use, reap the benefits of, and dispose of her assets in the 
manner she deems appropriate, provided the limits imposed by the legal 
order and the common good are not violated.1  This right, moreover, is 
essential for the exercise of individual autonomy.2  Property enables and 
reflects the decisions made by individuals with respect to their life plans.  
Property provides the material substratum that allows people to construct 
their identities and express their moral commitments.  Individual autonomy 
and property are thus deeply intertwined.  Consequently, the classical 
liberal concept of property imposes negative duties on both the state and 
individuals.3
Despite its ubiquity in the modern legal and political consciousness, the 
classical liberal conception of property competes with, and is challenged by, 
  Both should refrain from acting in such a way as to adversely 
affect individual rights to property. 
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 1. LOREN LOMANSKY, PERSONS, RIGHTS, AND THE MORAL COMMUNITY 111–51 (1987). 
 2. Eric Mack, Self-Ownership and the Right of Property, 73 MONIST 519 (1990). 
 3. Richard A. Epstein, Property Rights and the Rule of Law:  Classical Liberalism 
Confronts the Modern Administrative State 6–10 (Aug. 5, 2009) (Hoover Inst. Task Force on 
Property Rights), http://www.law.nyu.edu/ecm_dlv1/groups/public/@nyu_law_website__
academics__colloquia__legal_political_and_social_philosophy/documents/documents/ecm_
pro_062726.pdf. 
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other forms of imagining the institution.  Classical liberal property has been 
sharply criticized by theoretical perspectives as diverse as egalitarian 
liberalism,4 socialism,5 and communism.6  These perspectives generally 
challenge the classical liberal conception as incomplete or unjust.  Critics 
indicate, for example, that classical liberal property obscures the obligations 
and connections that the subject has with the community,7 or they 
emphasize the negative consequences that this right has on the distribution 
of wealth.8
I.  LEÓN DUGUIT AND THE IDEA OF THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF PROPERTY 
  At the normative level, opponents of classical liberal property 
offer a variety of alternatives, from the abolition of private ownership of the 
means of production to strong government intervention in the rights to 
property in order to achieve redistributive aims. 
One of these alternative concepts, and perhaps one of the most suggestive 
and influential of the twentieth century, is the social function of property.9  
This way of understanding property was articulated paradigmatically by the 
French jurist León Duguit10 in a set of six lectures given in Buenos Aires in 
1911.11  At these conferences, Duguit argued that property is not a right but 
rather a social function.12
 
 4. See JOHN CHRISTMAN, THE MYTH OF PROPERTY:  TOWARD AN EGALITARIAN THEORY 
OF OWNERSHIP 125–84 (1994); JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY ch. 12 
(Oxford Univ. Press 1990) (1988). 
  According to this view, property has internal 
 5. See P.J. PROUDHON, WHAT IS PROPERTY:  AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLE OF RIGHT 
AND OF GOVERNMENT (Benjamin R. Tucker trans., 1876). 
 6. See KARL MARX, THE ECONOMIC AND PHILOSOPHIC MANUSCRIPTS OF 1844, at 93–114 
(Foreign Languages Publ’g House 1961) (1844). 
 7. See Patricia J. Williams, On Being the Object of Property, in FEMINIST LEGAL 
THEORY:  READINGS IN LAW AND GENDER 165, 165–80 (Katharine T. Bartlett & Rosanne 
Kennedy eds., 1991). 
 8. See generally MICHAEL OTSUKA, LIBERTARIANISM WITHOUT INEQUALITY (2003); 
Peter Vallentyne, Libertarianism and the State, 24 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 187 (2007). 
 9. See generally M.C. Mirow, The Social-Obligation Norm of Property:  Duguit, 
Hayem, and Others, 22 FLA. J. INT’L L. 191 (2010). 
 10. León Duguit (1859–1928) was a professor of public law at the University of 
Bordeaux beginning in 1886.  For biographical information on Duguit, see José Luis 
Monereo Pérez & José Calvo Gonzalez, Léon Duguit (1859-1928):  Jurista de una Sociedad 
en Transformación, 4 REVISTA DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL EUROPEO 483, 483–86 (2005).  
Duguit is considered to be the father of the social function of property. See UGO MATTEI, 
BASIC PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW:  A COMPARATIVE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC 
INTRODUCTION 31 (2000); Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer, Florida’s Property Rights 
Protection Act:  Does It Inordinately Burden the Public Interest?, 48 FLA. L. REV. 695, 701 
(1996); David Schneiderman, Constitutional Approaches to Privitization:  An Inquiry into 
the Magnitude of Neo-liberal Constitutionalism, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2000, at 
83, 92. 
 11. See LEÓN DUGUIT, LAS TRANSFORMACIÓNES DEL DERECHO PÚBLICO Y PRIVADO 
(Editorial Heliasta 1975) [hereinafter DUGUIT, LAS TRANSFORMACIÓNES].  Some of Duguit’s 
works translated into English are LEÓN DUGUIT, LAW IN THE MODERN STATE (Frida Laski & 
Harold Laski trans., 1919) and Léon Duguit, Changes of Principle in the Field of Liberty, 
Contract, Liability, and Property, reprinted in THE CONTINENTAL LEGAL HISTORY SERIES, 
THE PROGRESS OF CONTINENTAL LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 65 (Layton Bartol 
Register & Ernest Bruncken trans., Little, Brown, & Co. 1918). 
 12. DUGUIT, LAS TRANSFORMACIÓNES, supra note 11, at 236. 
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limits—not just external ones as in the case of the liberal right to property.13  
The owner has obligations with respect to his things.  He cannot do what he 
wants with his property.  He is obliged to make it productive.  The wealth 
controlled by owners should be put at the service of the community by 
means of economic transactions.14
The idea of the social function of property is based on a description of 
social reality that recognizes solidarity as one of its primary foundations.
  Consequently, the state should protect 
property only when it fulfills its social function.  When the owner is not 
acting in a manner consistent with his obligations, the state should intervene 
to encourage or to punish him.  Taxation and expropriation are powerful 
tools for achieving such ends.  From this perspective, the state has both 
negative and positive obligations with respect to property. 
15  
For Duguit, the weaknesses of the classical liberal theory of property stem 
from the erroneous description of the individual and the society in which 
she is based.  Liberalism’s emphasis on the individual and her rights is, for 
him, closely intertwined with the description it offers of human beings and 
the political community.16  In liberal thought, people are essentially 
autonomous and rational beings.  Individuals have the ability to articulate, 
transform, and try to realize life plans by making use of reason.  
Consequently, the political community is a voluntary creation of individuals 
geared towards increasing the likelihood of autonomously and rationally 
constructing their life plans.17  The political community is the sum of the 
individuals that compose it.  Rights, like those of property, are the 
instruments articulated to ensure that the state does not intervene unduly in 
the continuous process of construction and revision of individual identity.  
To Duguit, this conception of the subject and society loses sight of the fact 
that the interdependence between people (which is nothing other than 
solidarity) is the central element of social reality.18
For Duguit, a precise description of society makes clear that its members 
have needs and capacities that are sometimes similar and other times 
different.
  Solidarity is not a 
political principle but a social fact. 
19  The social division of labor is therefore crucial to ensuring the 
satisfaction of these needs.  In order for the people and the community to 
flourish, each individual must comply with a series of functions determined 
by the position she occupies in society.  The theory of the social function of 
property is thus, in the words of Duguit, “realist” and “socialist”20
 
 13. See id. at 179. 
:  realist 
in that it is based solely on facts that can be known empirically; socialist in 
that it stems from basis of solidarity, that is, the interdependence that 
 14. Id. at 240. 
 15. Id. at 235–36. 
 16. Id. at 177. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 180–84. 
 19. Id. at 182. 
 20. Id. at 181. 
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characterizes society.  Duguit therefore draws explicitly on the positivism 
of Auguste Comte21 and the structural functionalism of Emile Durkheim.22
Based on this functionalist description of society, Duguit challenges both 
the individualism
 
23 and the metaphysical nature24 of the liberal right to 
property.  Both dimensions of liberal property, Duguit argues, are defined 
in a paradigmatic way in the Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1789 and 
the Napoleonic Code.25  Duguit considered the Declaration and the Code to 
be the two legal-political documents most representative of liberal thought.  
Duguit asserts that many jurists believe, wrongly, that these two texts 
contain the principles from which a perfect and eternal legal system can be 
derived,26 an order that would have the same formal characteristics as 
Euclidean geometry.27  Thus, for Duguit, challenging how property is 
conceived in these two sets of norms is challenging the core of liberal 
law.28
Property is the right of enjoying and disposing of things in the most 
absolute manner, provided they are not used in a way prohibited by the 
laws or statutes.  No one can be compelled to give up his property, except 
for the public good, and for a just and previous indemnity.
  The two central norms on matters of property in this legal-political 
framework are Article 2 of the Declaration and Articles 544 and 545 of the 
Napoleonic Code.  Article 2 of the Declaration states, “The purpose of all 
civil associations is the preservation of the natural and imprescriptible 
rights of man.  These rights are liberty, property, security, and resistance to 
oppression.”  Articles 544 and 545 of the civil code of Napoleon affirm 
that: 
29
According to these norms, Duguit states, property is defined as an 
individual, natural, and nearly absolute right, limited only by the legal order 
and the public interest. 
 
Duguit’s critique of the individualism of the liberal right to property has 
three components.  The first challenges the supposition from which the 
liberal right to property departs:  the existence of an isolated individual.30
 
 21. Id. at 176. 
  
For Duguit this is a premise that does not correspond with an accurate 
description of reality.  Human beings, when properly described, are not 
isolated beings who seek to construct and realize their life plans alone.  On 
the contrary, they are deeply interconnected beings that need each other to 
 22. Id. at 182. 
 23. Id. at 237. 
 24. Id. at 174–76. 
 25. Id. at 172. 
 26. For an analysis of Duguit’s anti-formalist positions, see Mauricio García-Villegas, 
Comparative Sociology of Law:  Legal Fields, Legal Scholarships, and Social Sciences in 
Europe and the United States, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 343, 349–56 (2006). 
 27. DUGUIT, LAS TRANSFORMACIÓNES, supra note 11, at 172. 
 28. For Duguit, civil law has four main components:  liberty, property, contracts, and 
torts. Id. at 183–84. 
 29. CODE NAPOLEON arts. 544–545 (Fr.). 
 30. DUGUIT, LAS TRANSFORMACIÓNES, supra note 11, at 178. 
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meet their physical and spiritual needs.  As mentioned, for Duguit, 
interdependence is a key feature of social reality.31
The second component of the argument makes explicit the inconsistency 
that exists for Duguit between the idea of an isolated individual and the 
right of property.
 
32
The third and final component of Duguit’s critique challenges the 
assumption that classical liberal property exists only to serve individual 
interests.
  If people live separately from other members of 
society, it does not make sense to speak of a right that imposes negative 
duties on third parties.  If human beings are monads that repel each other, 
what is the goal, Duguit asks, of a right that forces other members of 
society to refrain from intervening in the property of others? 
33  Duguit finds it objectionable that this right protects only the 
relationship between a subject and her property.  Classical liberal property 
obscures the connections between the economic needs of the community 
and the wealth that is recognized and protected through the institution we 
know as property.  It should also serve the community.  This does not mean 
that Duguit is committed to a socialist political perspective or that he is 
challenging capitalism.  He is very clear to distance himself from the 
former, and to accept the latter as a fact.34
Duguit also criticizes the metaphysical character of the liberal right to 
property.  On one hand, he challenges the concept of a subjective right.
  For Duguit, putting property at 
the service of the community means putting it into production.  His 
argument has nothing to do with state ownership of the means of production 
or with class struggle.  Normatively, Duguit is committed to what we might 
call the “rule of productivity.”  The wealth concentrated in property cannot 
remain unproductive.  The social consequences would be profoundly 
negative.  The needs of the community members would certainly not be 
satisfied and social cohesion would be in jeopardy. 
35
Nevertheless, the concept of the social function of property has not been 
relevant in the theoretical discussion on the content and effects of property 
  
For Duguit, this concept implies the existence of a will that is imposed on 
another will.  The existence of a subjective right implies the existence of a 
duty to a third party.  Thus, this type of right requires knowledge of the 
nature of individual will, a criterion to measure it, and another to apply it.  
Duguit states, however, that individual will cannot be known empirically.  
All we can know are the external manifestations of the will of individuals.  
Will is a metaphysical entity that cannot be grasped through the scientific 
method.  On the other hand, Duguit challenges the supposed natural 
character of the classical liberal right to property.  The jus-naturalism to 
which classical liberalism is committed is incompatible with its positivism.  
Natural rights are not made knowable through observation of the world; 
they are normative criteria without empirical basis. 
 
 31. Id. at 181. 
 32. Id. at 178. 
 33. Id. at 237. 
 34. Id. at 236. 
 35. Id. at 175. 
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alone.36  This idea has also been incorporated by a significant number of 
European and Latin American legal systems37 and has been instrumental in 
the political struggle that has occurred in some countries to achieve a fairer 
distribution of land.38  In Latin America, for example, the social function of 
property was included in several constitutions,39 such as the Mexican,40 the 
Colombian,41 and the Brazilian,42 and has been instrumental in justifying 
the agrarian and urban reform projects developed in several countries in the 
region.43
II.  THE SOCIAL OBLIGATION NORM IN U.S. PROPERTY LAW 
  As many of the papers published in this issue will show, the 
social function of property has had interesting conceptual histories and 
applications in Latin America. 
In the United States, no legal norm includes explicitly the words “social 
function of property.”  However, some U.S. legal scholars consider that a 
“social obligation” norm does exist in U.S. law, albeit perhaps only at the 
margins of property jurisprudence.  According to this norm, property 
owners have social responsibilities to others that extend beyond the highly 
individualized, and atomized, conventional account of property rights.44
 
 36. Ugo Mattei, The Peruvian Civil Code, Property and Plunder:  Time for a Latin 
American Alliance to Resist the Neo Liberal Order, 5 GLOBAL JURIST TOPICS 1, 8 (2005), 
http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1149&context=gj; Ngai Pindell, 
Finding a Right to the City:  Exploring Property and Community in Brazil and in the United 
States, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 435 (2006); Schneiderman, supra note 
  
The conventional account in U.S. law and theory situates the individual 
owner as insulated from the demand by others in society and owing no 
further obligation to them, except for the duty not to cause harm to others 
10, at 83–109. 
 37. See, for example, the German constitution of 1949, Article 14(2). GRUNDGEZETZ FÜR 
DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC LAW], art. 14, sec. 2 
(Ger.); infra notes 40–42. 
 38. GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, THE GLOBAL DEBATE OVER CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY:  
LESSONS FOR AMERICAN TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE 1–2 (2006); Rebecca Lubens, The Social 
Obligation of Property Ownership:  A Comparison of German and U.S. Law (bepress Legal 
Series, Working Paper No. 1607, 2006), http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/1607; Flavia 
Santinoni Vera, The Social Function of Property Rights in Brazil (Latin Am. & Caribbean 
Law. & Econ. Ass’n (ALACDE) Annual Papers, Berkeley Program in Law & Econ. 2006), 
available at http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/0tp371xs. 
 39. M.C. MIROW, LATIN AMERICAN LAW:  A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LAW AND 
INSTITUTIONS IN SPANISH AMERICA 205–06 (2004). 
 40. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS [C.P.], 5 de Febrero 
de 1917, art. 27. 
 41. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 58. 
 42. CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 5, XXIII (Braz.). 
 43. Thomas T. Ankerson & Thomas Ruppert, Tierra y Libertad:  The Social Function 
Doctrine and Land Reform in Latin America, 19 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 69, 95 (2006). 
 44. See generally HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY:  VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS (2011); 
JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT:  THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY (2000); Gregory S. 
Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 
745 (2009); Jedediah Purdy, A Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property:  A Renewed 
Tradition for New Debates, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1237 (2005); Jedediah Purdy, People as 
Resources:  Recruitment and Reciprocity in the Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property, 
56 DUKE L.J. 1047, 1054–56 (2007). 
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and their property.45  Scholars have long pushed backed against this view, 
situating property as central to organizing and shaping social relations, and 
entailing obligations to non-owners and the community as a whole.46
The social obligation norm is a concept with much plasticity.  The idea 
that property owners owe affirmative obligations to the welfare of others, 
and to societal welfare more generally, can map onto a number of different 
ideological orientations, including classical liberalism.  The obligation of 
property owners to contribute, through taxation, to the provision of public 
goods such as law enforcement, schools, and fire protection is a relatively 
“thin” but stable version of the norm.
  This 
relational view of property is an important building block for how scholars 
understand social obligation norms in U.S. property law. 
47  In a similar vein, from a law and 
economics standpoint, the presence of market failures (such as free riders 
and holdouts) might entail curtailing an owner’s dominion over his property 
in order to promote and maximize public welfare.48  Eminent domain has 
often been justified on the grounds that allowing the government to acquire 
or “take” private property under certain circumstances produces the most 
economically efficient result for taxpayers.49  One might also properly view 
a libertarian conception of ownership as entailing a social obligation to 
guarantee to all persons the resources necessary for individual autonomy 
and personhood.50  Such a view would not privilege the enforcement of the 
rights of property owners if the law does not also guarantee sufficient 
resources to non-property owners.51
Regardless of the specific ideological orientation that one brings to this 
idea of “social obligation,” it shares with Duguit’s idea of the “social 
function” of property recognition of the interdependence of individuals 
within a society and of the role that property has in promoting the common 
good.  At a minimum, the social obligation norm recognizes the ways in 
which property is central to human interactions, human flourishing, and the 
relationship between an individual and her community.
 
52
Professor Gregory Alexander has labored the most to develop the social 
obligation norm in the U.S., and to distinguish “thin(ner)” versions of the 
norm, such as those articulated above, from his “thick(er)” version.  
Alexander develops the norm to entail an obligation on the part of property 
  Beyond that 
recognition, the scope of the social obligation norm is something that will 
need further articulation in order to understand not only its normative 
contours but also its practical application. 
 
 45. Alexander, supra note 44, at 746–47. 
 46. See generally SINGER, supra note 44. 
 47. Alexander, supra note 44, at 753–57. 
 48. See, e.g., id. at 753; Hanoch Dagan, The Social Responsibility of Ownership, 92 
CORNELL L. REV. 1255, 1259 (2007). 
 49. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 55–56 (6th ed. 2003); 
Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 81–82 (1986). 
 50. Dagan, supra note 48, at 1259–60 & nn.30–31 (citing Margaret Jane Radin’s 
personhood account and John Rawls’s work). 
 51. Id. at 1260. 
 52. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 44, at 765–67; Dagan, supra note 48, at 1260–61. 
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owners to provide to society those benefits and goods that society 
reasonably regards as necessary for human flourishing.53  Developing this 
norm requires a fairly thick conception of the relationship between an 
individual and her community, a relationship which serves to anchor the 
norm in a particular social reality.54  Alexander’s articulation of this 
relationship resonates very strongly with Duguit’s description of social 
reality.55  For Alexander, like Duguit, the individual is not an isolated, self-
sufficient, social and political animal.  Rather, dependency and 
interdependency are constitutive of the human condition and, importantly, 
of the capacity of humans to flourish in society.56  Building on the 
“capabilities” approach of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, Alexander 
argues that development of one’s capabilities is a human good that society 
ought to promote through entitling each person to the material resources 
required to nurture the capabilities essential to human flourishing.57  That 
each person has an obligation to others in the community to promote the 
requisite capabilities necessary for human flourishing is based both on our 
interdependence with one another and on our shared acknowledgement, as 
rational moral beings, of the right of every being to develop these 
capabilities.58
Alexander’s robust, or thick, version of the social obligation norm is 
forthrightly redistributive in its aims and implications.  He recognizes that 
“human flourishing requires distributive justice, the ultimate objective of 
which is to give people what they need in order to develop the capabilities 
necessary for living the well-lived life.”
 
59  As such, an owner’s social 
obligation is to contribute to her community those benefits that the 
community reasonably regards as necessary for its members’ development 
of those human qualities essential to their capacity to flourish as moral 
agents.60  Alexander finds scattered throughout property doctrine examples 
in which private property owners are required to sacrifice their ownership 
interest in a way that comports with this social obligation norm and, 
importantly, in instances where neither law and economics nor classical 
liberal analysis can justify, or has a hard time justifying, such sacrifices.61
 
 53. Alexander, supra note 
  
According to Alexander, the thicker version of the social obligation norm is 
at work (or potentially at work) in eminent domain cases and cases 
adjudicating remedies for nuisance, both of which involve state-sanctioned 
forced sales of private property for the common good or community best 
44, at 760–74. 
 54. Id. at 757. 
 55. Alexander’s robust conception of community, and the individual’s relationship 
within it, was developed first in his work with Eduardo Peñalver. See generally Gregory S. 
Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver, Properties of Community, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES  L. 
127 (2009). 
 56. Alexander, supra note 44, at 760–61. 
 57. Id. at 762–65, 767–68. 
 58. Id. at 768–70. 
 59. Id. at 768. 
 60. Id. at 774. 
 61. Id. 
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interest.62  He also invokes his social obligation concept to explain cases in 
which the owner is prohibited from using his or her property in some way 
that the community regards as against its collective interest—such as in the 
case of historic preservation laws, environmental regulations, and beach 
access rights under the public trust doctrine.63
III.  PROPERTY THROUGH A SOCIAL LENS 
 
Both Duguit’s and Alexander’s work push against the classical liberal 
impulse to cabin the “core” of property rights as aligned with individual 
autonomy and to relegate the limitations on individual autonomy to the 
“periphery” of property rights.64  The classical liberal approach considers 
the owner’s right to possess and use tangible things, and to exclude others 
from possessing and using those things, as the core of the right to private 
property, and requires that any limitations on that right be justified by 
important societal interests.  Another way of thinking about the structure of 
the classical liberal version of the right to private property in U.S. law is 
that it creates a strong, albeit rebuttable, presumption in favor of the 
owner’s right to exclude; a presumption that can be overcome by important 
societal interests.65
Duguit and Alexander paint a much more complex picture of what is at 
the core of the right to own property.
 
66  Property’s social function, and the 
owner’s obligation to provide certain benefits to society, instead work as an 
internal constraint on private property rights.  As such, a society’s shared 
values and moral commitments exist, perhaps uncomfortably, alongside the 
owner’s right to exclude.  The core of property, then, ideally reflects the 
plurality of values that we as a society believe property should serve, and it 
is up to the legal system to negotiate them in defining the contours of 
private property rights.67
What form this negotiation assumes will vary depending upon the legal, 
political, and social culture of a particular society.  This variance is what 
makes a comparative examination of the ways these ideas and concepts 
have played out so rich and fascinating.  On May 14, 2011, we convened an 
impressive group of scholars to examine the contemporary interpretations 
and use of the social function of property in Latin America and its exclusion 
or marginal inclusion in the U.S.  In particular, we wanted to highlight and 
examine the interpretations of the social function of property articulated 
during the last two decades by some Latin American constitutional courts, 
 
 
 62. Id. at 775–82. 
 63. Id. at 791–810; see also id. at 810–15 (discussing implications for intellectual 
property law). 
 64. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. 
L. REV. 1685, 1737 (1976) (classical legal theory is concerned with identifying “core” 
individual freedoms and a “periphery” of limitations on those freedoms). 
 65. See Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap:  The Indirect Relation Between Ends and Means 
in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959, 964–67 (2009). 
 66. See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, Reply:  The Complex Core of Property, 94 
CORNELL L. REV. 1063 (2009); see also supra notes 11–14 and accompanying text. 
 67. Alexander, supra note 66, at 1066. 
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as well as the symbolic and material effects that these readings have had in 
the region.  Similarly, we wanted to scrutinize and analyze the concepts and 
institutions through which the social function of property has entered the 
U.S. legal system and explore why these concepts and institutions have had 
such a limited influence.  Finally, we sought to identify the tensions and 
connections that the social function of property has with relatively new 
legal concepts like the ecological function of property, and to explore its 
connections with various historical discourses and social structures in the 
U.S. and Latin America. 
A.  Contemporary and Theoretical Approaches 
to the Social Function of Property 
The papers in this issue are organized in two sections.  The first, 
“Contemporary Theoretical Approaches to the Social Function of 
Property,” is composed of four articles.  Gregory Alexander’s paper 
presents an analysis of some of the major theoretical perspectives in the 
United States that defend the idea that property inherently includes social 
obligations.68
However, Alexander’s article is not just descriptive, analytical, and 
critical; it is also normative.  Alexander argues that normative pluralism is 
morally superior to normative monism.  A theory of the social function of 
property that is justified by and seeks to realize multiple values is capable 
of recognizing the different spheres that make up society and the different 
values that should control them.  This type of theory also has the ability to 
interpret property in a manner that accommodates the characteristics and 
normative requirements made in each of these realms (social, family, and 
work, for example).  Consequently, in his article, Alexander examines the 
significance of the concepts of normative pluralism and monism in light of 
contemporary moral theory, presents a taxonomy of theories of the social 
function of property that draws on these two concepts, and examines the 
problem of the incommensurability of values that supposedly affects the 
theories committed to normative pluralism. 
  Alexander judiciously examines the work of Hanoch Dagan, 
Joseph William Singer, and Jedediah Purdy.  In his analysis, Alexander 
seeks to clarify whether these theories of the social function of property 
appeal to a monism or pluralism of values in order to justify their 
assumptions.  This is a topic that Alexander believes has received little 
attention and is central to assessing the plausibility of each of these 
perspectives.  Alexander seeks to determine whether these theories are 
based on a single value (autonomy, for example) or if they are justified by 
multiple values (autonomy, community, and equality, among others). 
The essay by Nestor Davidson examines the dominant political and legal 
discourses on property in the United States.69
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  Davidson argues that the 
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individualist liberal interpretation advocated by James Madison and the 
republican interpretation defended by Thomas Jefferson are the axes around 
which the U.S. debate on property has historically revolved.  Davidson also 
argues, though, that there is a third perspective that has been given much 
less attention but that has had important symbolic effects in the legal 
community:  that advocated by Alexander Hamilton.  Davidson argues that 
Hamilton defends the idea that property must have social obligations.  In 
Davidson’s view, Hamilton defends the idea that property should be used in 
ways that benefit the community and that conflicts over property must be 
resolved, protecting existing rights in favor of promoting the development 
of the community. 
Eduardo Peñalver offers an analysis of the relationship between property 
and memory.70
The article by Colin Crawford has as its main objective the defense of a 
normative theory of the social function of property.
  Peñalver structures his analysis around the distinction 
between the memory of property and the memory in property.  The first 
refers to how individuals or communities recall an object that they once 
owned.  The second refers to the memories that have become part and 
parcel of the property.  Peñalver also argues that both can be divided into 
physical memory or distributive memory.  Physical memory is connected to 
particular objects that were owned and remembered by an individual or 
community, a house or a farm, for example; distributive memory is related 
to forms of allocation of property transferred inter-generationally and that 
influence the political and economic structure of a society, such as 
feudalism or capitalism.  Finally, Peñalver examines the relationship 
between each of these categories and the law.  Thus, for example, he studies 
the relationship between memory of or about property and adverse 
possession and taxes.  In Peñalver’s conception, the analysis of the 
relationship between memory and property will make explicit some of the 
social functions of property that usually remain in the margins of the social, 
political, and legal community. 
71
 
 70. See Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property’s Memories, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1071 (2011). 
  For Crawford, a 
proper interpretation of this institution should seek to facilitate the 
flourishing of all citizens of a political community.  To justify his argument, 
Crawford draws on the theory of justice advocated by Amartya Sen.  
Consequently, Crawford examines the relationship between property and 
the capacities that human beings should develop in order to exercise their 
autonomy.  Crawford also argues that to comply with its objective, a theory 
of the social function of property that has human flourishing as its main 
goal must be closely connected with the concept of sustainable 
development.  For Crawford, the ecological function of property must be 
one of the dimensions of the category “social function of property.”  
Finally, Crawford analyzes the connections between the doctrine of “socio-
environmentalism” and the social function of property.  Crawford argues 
that this doctrine has multiple sources, from U.S. environmental law to the 
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theory of environmental human rights to the global movement for 
environmental justice.  Nevertheless, Crawford also points out that this 
doctrine originated in Latin America from the region’s experience with the 
application of and theoretical reflection on the social function of property.  
For Crawford, judicious examination of the contemporary forms the 
institution has acquired must go through a social-environmental analysis in 
Latin America. 
B.  The Social Function of Property at Work in Latin America 
The second section, “The Social Function of Property in Latin America:  
Legal and Case Law Developments,” is composed of three articles.  In the 
first article of this section, Daniel Bonilla argues that the structure of the 
legal regime of property in Colombia has been shaped by liberalism.72
In the second paper of this section, Alexandre dos Santos Cunha provides 
an analysis of the social function of property in Brazil.
  A 
genealogical analysis of the recent history of the legal forms that define and 
regulate property, Bonilla argues, provides evidence for three key periods in 
the creation and consolidation of the right to property in the country.  These 
three periods, Bonilla adds, revolve around different forms of interpreting 
and weighing the three fundamental values in the liberal canon:  autonomy, 
equality, and solidarity.  The first period, beginning in 1886 and ending in 
1936, is marked by a classical liberal property regime in which the 
Constitution and civil law form an ideologically coherent set that prioritizes 
the principle of autonomy over the principles of equality and solidarity.  
The second period, between 1936 and 1991, is structured by a mixed 
system that recognizes the social function of property in the Constitution 
but preserves an individualistic notion of property in the civil code.  The 
third and final regime of property, beginning in 1991 and still in effect 
today, is an ideologically consistent constitutional and legal framework 
committed to the idea that the right to property must be defined through the 
principles of solidarity and equality.  In his article, Bonilla argues that the 
three periods comprising the recent history of the right to property in 
Colombia are structured around a set of five conceptual oppositions:  
individualism–solidarity; limited intervention–general intervention; 
private–public; Constitution as political program–Constitution as norm; and 
property as a right–property as social function.  In his article, Bonilla 
analyzes how these conceptual oppositions configure each of the key 
periods in the recent history of property in Colombia. 
73
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  Cunha argues that 
this theory enters the Brazilian legal system as a result of the influence of 
Italian jurists Pietro Cogliolo and Enrico Cimbali.  Cunha indicates that the 
work of Duguit was not decisive for the reinterpretation of the classical 
liberal concept of property in Brazil, as it was in other Latin American 
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countries such as Colombia or Chile.  Consequently, Cunha states, this 
theory has not been interpreted in Brazil as imposing internal limits on 
property.  Brazilian courts, influenced by Cogliolo and Cimbali, have 
understood that the social function is a justification of the power of the 
legislature to create external limits to the exercise of property.  Cunha also 
argues that although the social function of property enters the Brazilian 
legal system with the Constitution of 1934, it is only with the issuance of 
the civil code of 2002 that this concept of property gains strength and 
permeates the Brazilian legal system.  Accordingly, Cunha’s essay analyzes 
how the civil code of 2002 has influenced the way the Brazilian jurists 
understand the social function of rights in general and the social function of 
property in particular. 
In the third article of this section, M.C. Mirow examines the 
constitutionalization of the social function of property in Chile.74
CONCLUSION 
  Mirow 
thus examines the differences between the Constitution of 1833 and that of 
1925 with respect to property.  In particular, he makes explicit the 
differences between the classical liberal concept of property that 
characterizes the former, and the functionalist concept of property that 
characterizes the latter.  Similarly, Mirow studies the influence that Duguit 
had on this change in the Chilean legal system.  Mirow carefully analyzes 
the debates among the members of the Constituent Assembly that drafted 
the Constitution of 1925, and analyzes the impact that Duguit’s lectures in 
Buenos Aires had on the social function of rights in these discussions.  
Finally, Mirow discusses the role that President Arturo Alessandri played in 
transforming the way property was conceived in the Chilean legal system.   
As this set of papers illustrates, the ongoing academic discussion about 
the social function of property has many dimensions.  Moreover, the idea 
that property owners owe social obligations to others can play out quite 
differently across various legal, political, economic, and social systems.  
Our goal in this symposium was to continue to add texture to the discussion 
and to highlight the ways in which the social function of property has 
operated in Latin American systems.  We thank each of the authors for their 
considerable contribution to this important topic and look forward to 
continuing the conversation. 
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